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Abstract
In this paper, a novel economic approach, based on the framework of contract theory, is proposed
for providing incentives for LTE over unlicensed channels (LTE-U) in cellular-networks. In this model,
a mobile network operator (MNO) designs and offers a set of contracts to the users to motivate them
to accept being served over the unlicensed bands. A practical model in which the information about the
quality-of-service (QoS) required by every user is not known to the MNO and other users, is considered.
For this contractual model, the closed-form expression of the price charged by the MNO for every user
is derived and the problem of spectrum allocation is formulated as a matching game with incomplete
information. For the matching problem, a distributed algorithm is proposed to assign the users to the
licensed and unlicensed spectra. Simulation results show that the proposed pricing mechanism can
increase the fraction of users that achieve their QoS requirements by up to 45% compared to classical
algorithms that do not account for users requirements. Moreover, the performance of the proposed
algorithm in the case of incomplete information is shown to approach the performance of the same
mechanism with complete information.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile video traffic is expected to represent 78% of the world’s mobile data traffic by 2021
[1]. This traffic includes video conferencing, video on demand, and streaming videos which
are bandwidth-intensive applications that are rapidly straining the capacity of wireless cellular
systems. To support all this traffic and ensure the required application-specific quality-of-service
(QoS), mobile network operators (MNOs) have started exploiting the possibility of leveraging
the somewhat under-used unlicensed spectrum. This is done by enabling the base stations to
offload part of their traffic over the WiFi network using the so-called LTE over unlicensed bands
(LTE-U) technology [2], [3], [4]. However, to successfully deploy LTE-U, one must ensure a fair
usage of the unlicensed bands by developing new coexistence frameworks [2], [3], [4]. Moreover,
over the unlicensed bands, there is no QoS guarantee and the MNOs must incite the users to
accept the best effort service based on their traffic type [2].
In this regard, several works [5], [6], [7], [8], [4], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] have addressed
the problem of coexistence over the unlicensed channels so that the LTE traffic served over unli-
censed spectrum does not degrade the performance of the WiFi users (WUs). The authors in [5]
proposed a mechanism that jointly determines a dynamic channel selection, carrier aggregation
and fractional spectrum access for LTE-U systems. In [8], the authors proposed a cross-system
learning algorithm that allows the LTE-U small base stations (SBSs) to autonomously select the
unlicensed channels over which they transmit and determine their transmit power. The authors
in [4] formulated the load balancing between licensed and unlicensed bands as an optimization
problem to maximize the overall users’ rate. In the model of [4], the optimal time usage of the
unlicensed channels by cellular base stations (BSs) is determined in a centralized way based
on the global traffic. The work in [9] formulated the unlicensed spectrum allocation problem
with uplink-downlink decoupling as a noncooperative game in which the BSs are the players
that select the unlicensed channels over which they serve their users. The goal of the BSs is to
optimize the uplink and downlink sum-rate while balancing the licensed and unlicensed spectra
between the users. The authors in [10] formulated the unlicensed spectrum allocation problem
as a student-project matching problem with externalities. In the model of [10], a swap-matching
algorithm is proposed in which the BSs propose to the users a list of unlicensed bands over which
they can be served. In [11], an optimization problem is formulated to jointly allocate licensed
3and unlicensed bands while maximizing the users’ sum-rate and ensuring fairness among these
users.
The work in [12] proposed a distributed traffic offloading scheme for LTE-U scenarios with
a single base station. The authors in [13] proposed an economic model for the allocation of
licensed band to the LTE-U BSs that can serve mobile and fixed users over unlicensed channels
for free. In [14], the authors proposed a dynamic coexistence mechanism based on deep learning
enabling multiple small base stations to select the unlicensed channels and the time they use
every channel while guaranteeing fairness with WiFi users and other LTE-U operators. The work
in [7] used multi-game theory to propose a novel coexistence framework between LTE and WiFi
users. In particular, a cooperative Nash bargaining game (NBG) and a bankruptcy game were
formulated to allocate unlicensed resources. The authors in [15] introduced the concept of right
sharing for mobile network operators allowing the operators to share and trade their spectrum
access rights to the unlicensed bands. In [16], the authors proposed an orthogonal listen-before
talk coexistence paradigm, a licensed-assisted access (LAA) scheme, that provides a substantial
improvement in performance compared to classical listen-before talk mechanism, as it imposes
no penalty on existing WiFi networks. The authors in [6] proposed a hybrid MAC protocol to
jointly optimizing the sleep period and the contention window size in LTE-U, to maximize the
network performance in terms of the total network throughput and throughput fairness of LTE-
U and WiFi. The work in [17] proposed a coexistence mechanism based on matching theory
and proposed a mechanism that accounts for network dynamics and wad evaluated under two
typical user mobility models. Other works [18], [19] have explored other alternatives to improve
the backhaul connectivity via the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In [18], the
authors studied the coexistence problem of device-to-device (D2D) and cellular networks in the
presence of a single UAV that provides downlink transmission to support the users. The work
in [19] proposed a backhaul framework in which the UAVs are utilized to link the core network
and SBSs when the ground backhaul is either unavailable or limited in capacity.
Remarkably, none of these works [5], [6], [7], [8], [4], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] have
addressed the economic aspect of LTE-U and all have strictly focused on the fair coexistence over
the unlicensed bands. However, mobile video content that requires high QoS represents most of
the traffic that is exchanged by the users over cellular network. Such QoS requirements cannot
be guaranteed over the unlicensed bands due the medium access protocol that is used by the
4WUs and imposed to the BSs. Thus, without a suitable pricing mechanism, introducing LTE-U
can create a new concern in which some users with privilege would not be incentivized to use
the unlicensed bands while other users might be always offloaded to the unlicensed bands [20].
This economic concerns has been also raised in [21], [22], [23]. In [22], the authors proposed
an auction mechanism, which enables the LTE provider to negotiate with the WiFi access point
owners an exclusive or shared access of the unlicensed channels. The authors in [23] formulated
the allocation problem of the unlicensed bands as a Stackelberg game in which each operator
sets an interference penalty price for each user that causes interference to the WiFi access point
(WAP), and the users choose the unlicensed channel and determine the optimal transmit power
in the chosen channel. Hence, it is necessary to develop economic models that incite the LTE
users to receive their traffic via the unlicensed channels. Moreover, the spectrum allocation
mechanism must accounts for the traffic type of the users in terms of QoS requirements since
no coexistence framework exists in the literature in which the requirement in terms of QoS of
two separate devices is considered [20].
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel incentive mechanism for facilitating
the deployment of LTE-U over cellular networks. We consider a model in which an MNO
proposes agreements to a number of LTE-U users that are subscribed to its services to incite them
to accept being served over the WiFi network. We consider a practical model with asymmetric
and incomplete information to account for the heterogeneity of the QoS that is required by each
user and is unknown to the MNO as well as other users. The proposed approach, based on
contract theory [24], [25], allows an MNO to define a contract for each user in a model with
asymmetric and incomplete information, by fixing the price of serving each content and the
fraction of the content that is served via the licensed and unlicensed channels. Unlike classical
contract-theoretic models [26], [27], [28], [29], we consider a Bayesian model with incomplete
information in which the private information of a given user as well as its selected contract
is not revealed to the other users. The goal of the MNO is to maximize its own reward while
ensuring the feasibility of the contract it proposes to the users. For this contract model, we derive
the closed-form of the price and prove its optimality and uniqueness. Moreover, we model the
licensed and unlicensed spectrum allocation in an LTE-U system as a priority-based Bayesian
matching game to determine the amount of traffic to serve over each of the frequency bands. For
the formulated game, we propose a distributed algorithm to assign the licensed and unlicensed
5frequency bands to the users based on their priority and their QoS requirement. Then, we prove
that the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a Bayesian stable matching. Simulation results
show that the proposed pricing mechanism can increase the fraction of users that achieve their
requirements in terms of QoS with up to 45% compared to a uniform pricing mechanism.
Moreover, the performance of the proposed mechanism for the case of incomplete information
is shown to approach the performance of the same mechanism when all the information about
users’ requirements is available to the MNO.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is provided in Section II. In
Section III, the problem is formulated as a contract theory problem. In Section IV, the allocation
problem of licensed and unlicensed bands is formulated as a Bayesian matching game. Section
V presents the simulation results. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wireless network composed of a set S of S LTE-U BSs that can serve the
downlink traffic of a set N of N users over both licensed and unlicensed bands. Since the
BSs cannot guarantee any QoS when they serve users over the unlicensed bands, the MNO
has to design an economic model that motivates users to accept being served over unlicensed
channels depending on their QoS requirement. To define the optimal pricing policy and spectrum
allocation mechanism, we use the two frameworks of contract theory and Bayesian matching
games. Contract theory is a powerful mathematical tool for creating economic incentives while
matching games enable to capture the interconnection between the users that share the same
resources and deal with the combinatorial nature of such resource allocation problems. The
pricing and spectrum allocation mechanisms are illustrated in Fig. 1.
In the proposed model, each MNO specifies a performance-reward bundle contract (αi, βi, pii),
where pii is the monetary reward that is charged by the MNO to user i ∈ N , αi is the fraction
of user i’s traffic that is served over the licensed bands, and βi is the fraction of traffic that is
served via the unlicensed bands. Since users have different QoS requirements depending on their
traffic, we introduce a type θi ∈ Θi = [
¯
θi, θ¯i] for each user i. The type represents the willingness
of the user to pay for its traffic. In fact, the higher the required download rate, the more the
user would be willing to pay. We sort the users’ requirements in terms of QoS in an ascending
order and classify them into K types denoted by θ1, ..., θK with K ≤ C. Each type represents
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Fig. 1: Pricing and spectrum allocation in an LTE-U system.
the type of the user’s traffic or the willingness of a user to pay for the service offered by the
MNO. This information is private to each user and is not available to the other users. The types
are ordered as follows:
θ1 < ... < θk < ... < θK , k ∈ K = {1, ..., K}.
Here, we assume that all of the requests generated by the users are launched by different users.
Instead of offering the same contract to all of the users, the MNO must offer different contracts
to different users according to their types. This enables the MNO to account for the heterogeneous
QoS requirements of the users and their willingness to pay for the service offered by the MNO.
Moreover, the MNO must account for the interdependence between the contract designed for
each type that appears in the performance achievable by every user when selecting the contract
designed for its type. Such interdependence appears in the achievable rate by each user which
depends on the offload policy {(αi, βi)}i∈K that determines the amount of traffic that is served
7over both licensed and unlicensed bands for all users’ types. The users are free to accept or
decline any type of contracts. If a user declines to receive any contract, we assume that a user
signs a contract (αi, βi, pii) = (0, 0, 0). Next, we define the utilities of the MNO and users in the
system.
A. Mobile Network Operator’s Utility
The utility of an MNO corresponds to the difference between the price charged to its users
and the cost for serving them which is widely used in the literature as it captures practical
considerations [30], [31], [32]. The utility of the MNO when serving a user of type θi can be
given by:
uo,i(θ) = pii(θi,θ−i)− ci(αi(θ), θi,θ−i), (1)
where pii(θi,θ−i) is the price charged by the MNO to a given user of type i, θ is a vector that
groups the types of all the users, and θ−i represents the same vector without the type of user i.
We define the cost ci(α(θ), θi,θ−i) as the transmit power needed to serve a user of type θi
with a rate rsi from its associated BS s ∈ S which depends on the rates required by the other
users. Thus, the transmit power cost can be given by:
ci (αi(θ), θi,θ−i) = psi(αi(θ)) =
(
e
r
req
i
w − 1
)(
σ20 +
∑
j∈S\s
∑
k∈U |hji|2δjkpji (αk(θ))
)
|hsi|2 , (2)
where rreqi is the required rate of user i, psi(.) is the transmit power from BS s to user i, hsi
is the channel gain, w is the bandwidth, and σ20 is the noise variance. δjk is a binary variable
that is equal to 1 when SBS j is connected to user k and 0 otherwise. when We note that the
transmit power pji(αk(θ)) of the other BSs depends on the type of all users as the served user
is affected by the interference from all the other BSs. For notational convenience, we use αi,
αi(θi,θ−i) and αi(θ) interchangeably.
B. Users’ Utility
The goal of a user i of type θi is to maximize its benefit which can be defined as the difference
between the achievable rate and the price charged by the MNO:
ui(αi,θ) = θivi (αi(θi,θ−i), βi(θi,θ−i), θi)− pii(θi,θ−i), (3)
8where vi is the valuation of the user. This function can be defined as the time needed for the
MNO to serve the user’s traffic or equivalently, the achievable rate by the user. Note that vi is
a decreasing function of the types θ−i. In fact, the larger the type of other users, the higher is
the traffic load on the licensed bands, and thus the QoS experienced by the user decreases. The
valuation function of a user is given by:
vi(θi,θ−i) = η(rsi(αi(θ), βi(θ), θi)− rreqi )2, (4)
where η is a parameter and rsi(αi(θ), βi(θ), θi) represents the achievable data rate by user i when
served from BS i over both licensed and unlicensed bands. We choose a quadratic function to
model the valuation of users to capture the fact that user i is only satisfied by the rate when it
attains its target rate. Thus, the valuation function of a user i is maximized at rreqi and decreases
when the rate achieved by the user exceeds or is lower than rreqi . The achievable rate by user i
is given by:
rsi(αi(θ), βi(θ), θi) = Et
[
wsi log
(
1 +
psi(αi(θ))|hsi|2
σ2 + I(αi(θ),θ)
)]
+ Et [κsi(βi(θ),θ)] , (5)
where I =
∑
l∈S\s
∑
k∈U δlkpli(αk(θ))|hli|2 is the interference experienced by user i from the
BSs over the licensed bands, and κsi(βi(θ)),θ) is the rate that user i achieves when served by
BS s over the unlicensed band and is given by:
κsi(βi(θ),θ) =
w
′
si log
(
1 +
p′si(αi,θi)|h′si|2
σ′2+I′(βi(θ),θ)
)
, if I ′ ≤ Ith,
0, otherwise,
(6)
where w′si is the bandwidth of the unlicensed channel, p
′
si is the transmit power from BS s to user
i over the unlicensed channel, and I ′ =
∑
w∈S∪W\s p
′
wi|hwi|2 is the interference experienced by
user i from all the transmitting BSs and WiFi users in W over the same unlicensed channel. For
the unlicensed channel, we define an interference threshold Ith that is used by each BS to decide
whether to transmit or not over the unlicensed channel. When a given BS senses an interference
level that exceeds Ith, it does not transmit its content which results in a backoff period. Note
that the interference experienced by any user depends on the types of all the other users and the
amount of traffic that is served over the licensed and unlicensed bands.
Since users do not have information about other users’ types, we assume that the profile type
θ = [θ1, ..., θn] is drawn from the set Θ = ×Θi according to a distribution P (θ) with density
p(θ) which is common knowledge to all users. The types of users are assumed to be statistically
9independent such that φ(θ) =
∏
i∈N φi(θi). Moreover, considering a model with incomplete
information, each user’s strategy not only depends on its beliefs about φ(θ), but also on its
beliefs about the author users’ beliefs about φ(θ). Given the distribution of the users’ types,
each user seeks to maximize its expected utility given by:
u¯i(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
ui(αi, θi,θ−i). (7)
The expected valuation function is defined as v¯i(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
vi(α(θ), β(θ), θi) and the expected
price is p¯ii(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
pii(θi,θ−i). The optimization problem of the MNO can be defined as
follows:
max
{αi(.),pii(.)}∀i
∫
Θ
∑
i∈N
[pii(θi,θ−i)− ci(θi,θ−i)] dP (θ),
s. t. 0 ≤ αi(θ) ≤ 1.
(8)
In this formulation, we do not make any constraint on the participation of the users. Thus, when
proposing the contracts resulting from solving (8), users may prefer not to select any of the
contracts or select contracts that are not designed for their types. To analyze this economic
incentive problem, we propose a solution based on the Nobel-prize winning framework of
contract theory for designing feasible contracts [25]. Moreover, we consider a practical case
in which users have incomplete knowledge of other users’ types and the contracts they select.
Thus, the goal of each user is to select the most optimal contract based only on the distribution
of the other users’ types.
Next, we use the framework of contract theory to determine the pricing mechanism at the
MNO that incite the users to accept being served over unlicensed channels. Then, we introduce
Bayesian matching theory to propose a distributed algorithm that enables the users to achieve
their requirement in terms of QoS. In other words, the matching algorithm will determine the
amount of traffic that should be served over both licensed and unlicensed spectrum and thus
determining the values of αi and βi for all i ∈ U .
III. CONTRACTS DESIGN FOR UNLICENSED SPECTRUM PRICING
To ensure that the users have an incentive to collaborate with the MNO by accepting to be
served via unlicensed bands, the MNO must design feasible contracts that ensure the participation
of the users by at least selecting one of the contracts that the MNO proposes. Moreover, the
MNO must motivate each user to select the contract designed for its own type.
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In contrast to classical contract models that are used to model resource allocation problems
in wireless networks such as in [26], [27], [28], we consider a Bayesian model. In addition to
information asymmetry that captures the unavailability of certain user types to the MNO, we
assume that the type of every user as well as the contract selected by that user is not known
to other users. Such information is important in our model due to the interdependence of the
users’ contracts that appears in the rates achievable by every user. Thus, a user has to determine
it most optimal contract based only on the distribution of users types which is specific to our
model. In such system, the feasibility conditions of the contracts are defined differently.
A. Feasibility of a Contract
In a Bayesian model, the MNO must design contracts for the users, that satisfy the two
following constraints:
Definition 1. Truthfully implementable Bayesian strategies (TIBS) : A contract f(θ) is truthfully
implementable in Bayesian strategies if there exists a direct mechanism Γ such that truth-telling
is a Bayesian equilibrium. In other words, it is better for a user to select the contract defined
for its type than selecting another contract, i.e., ∀i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi,∫
Θ−i
ui(αi, θi,θ−i) ≥
∫
Θ−i
ui(αi, θˆi,θ−i), (9)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi and θˆi 6= θi.
This condition ensures that none of the users can achieve a better performance in the network
by changing its type. The second condition ensures that the contract selected by a user should
guarantee that the expected utility of the user is nonnegative given the types distribution Θ−i.
Definition 2. Interim Individually Rational Contract (IIR): A contract is interim individually
rational if: ∫
Θ−i
ui(αi, θi,θ−i) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N . (10)
In a Bayesian model, we can state the following lemmas from the two previous conditions.
Lemma 1. For any feasible contract f(θ) = (αi(θ), βi(θ), pii(θ)), we have p¯ii(θi) ≥ p¯ii(θˆi) if
and only if v¯i(θi) ≥ v¯i(θˆi) for all θˆi ∈ Θi.
11
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 shows that a user that pays more for its traffic should receive higher QoS or
performance level compared to users that pay less, and vice versa. Next lemma shows the
performance that should be achieved by the users based on the price they pay.
Lemma 2. For any feasible contract f(θ) = (αi(θ), βi(θ), pii(θ)), if θi ≥ θj , then v¯i(αi, θi) ≥
v¯i(αi, θj).
Proof. We prove this lemma using the TIBS constraint. For a user i of type θi and user j of
type θj , we have:
θiv¯i(αi, θi)− p¯ii(θi) ≥ θiv¯i(αi, θj)− p¯ij(θj), (11)
and,
θj v¯i(αi, θj)− p¯ij(θj) ≥ θj v¯i(αi, θi)− p¯ii(θi). (12)
By adding the two inequalities, we get:
θiv¯i(αi, θi) + θj v¯i(αi, θj) ≥ θiv¯i(αi, θj) + θj v¯i(αi, θi), (13)
which is equivalent to:
(θi − θj)v¯i(α, θi) ≥ (θi − θj)v¯i(α, θj). (14)
Lemma 2 shows that a user of a higher type should receive a higher valuation. Note that the
highest expected performance can be achieved only if its traffic is served through the licensed
bands. Thus, when the application of the user requires a high data rate, the fraction of served
traffic over licensed spectrum should be larger.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we conclude that for a feasible contract, all contracts satisfy:
0 ≤ p¯ii(θ1) ≤ p¯ii(θ2) ≤ ... ≤ p¯ii(θK), (15)
0 ≤ v¯i(αi, θ1) ≤ v¯i(αi, θ2) ≤ ... ≤ v¯i(αi, θK). (16)
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B. Incentive Mechanism Design
At the MNO, the optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
max
{αi(θ),pii(θ)}∀i
∫
Θ
∑
i∈N
[pii(θi,θ−i)− ci(θi,θ−i)] dP (θ),
s.t. (9),∀i ∈ N ,
(10),∀i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ αi(θ) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N ,
(17)
where the first two constraints represent the TIBS and IIR conditions that ensure the feasibility
of a contract. In addition to the non-convexity of the formulated optimization problem, there is
a large number of constraints that increase the complexity of the problem. To solve the problem
(17), we first state the following equivalence result.
Theorem 1. A contract is both TIBS and IIR if and only if ∀i ∈ N ,
1) v¯i(αi, θi) is nondecreasing,
2) u¯i(θi) = u¯i(
¯
θi) +
∫ θi
¯
θi
v¯i(α, θi)(η)dη, for all θi, and
3) u¯i(
¯
θi) ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Now, we solve (17) by first writing the price as a function of the amount of traffic served
through the licensed and unlicensed channels and give the following result.
Proposition 1. Let {(α∗i , pi∗i )}∀i∈N be a the optimal contract with fixed time allocations {α∗i ,∀i}.
The optimal price for every type is given by:
p¯i∗1 = θ1v¯1(α
∗
i , θi),
p¯i∗i = θiv¯i(α
∗
i , θi) +
∫ θi
θi
v¯i(α
∗
i , η)dη,∀i ∈ N . (18)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Having defined the closed-form expression of the price charged by the MNO for every user, we
have to derive the optimal values of α∗ to define the amount of traffic that should be served over
both licensed and unlicensed channels. For this, based on Proposition 1, we write the allocation
problem of the licensed and unlicensed spectra by simplifying the initial problem (17) in which
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we replace the optimal price by its expression as derived in (18). Thus, the allocation problem
of the spectrum can be defined as follows:
max
{αi(θ)}∀i
∫
Θ
∑
i∈N
[
θiv¯i(αi, θi)− ci(θi,θ−i) +
∫ θi
θi
v¯i(α
∗
i , η)dη
]
dP (θ),
subject to 0 ≤ αi(θ) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
(19)
The assignment problem of the traffic to the licensed and unlicensed bands is equivalent to the
Knapsack problem which is NP-hard. Thus, due to the interdependence between the amount of
traffic served over the licensed and unlicensed bands for the users, it is difficult to solve (19)
using classical optimization approaches. To address this problem, we propose a novel approach
to assign the files requested by the users to the licensed and unlicensed bands while accounting
for the QoS requirement of each file. To this end, we use the framework of matching theory
with incomplete information in which the two disjoint sets of BS-channel pairs and user-subfile
pairs are matched to one another by the MNO [33], [34]. The files are assumed to be divided
into subfiles of the same size. In this model, the types of the users are not known to the BSs
neither to the MNO.
IV. FREQUENCY BAND ALLOCATION AS A BAYESIAN MATCHING GAME
In this section, we formulate a matching game with incomplete information which is also
known as Bayesian matching game with externalities [33], [34], [35], to determine the fraction
of each requested file that should be served over both licensed frequency bands and unlicensed
channels. A matching game is defined by two-sets of players that evaluate one another using
preference relations. The game is considered Bayesian because the BSs do not have information
regarding users’ types and only have the distribution of the types. Moreover, the assignment of
the channels to the users is done by the principal which is not aware of the types of the users
neither of their utility functions. The matching problem is considered with externalities due to
the interdependence between users preferences. In fact, the performance that is achieved by a
given user depends on the global amount of traffic that is served over the same frequency band.
We define traffic of the users as set of file chunks F = {f11, ..., f1K1 , ..., fF1, ..., f1KF } in which
each file fl of size Lfl bits that is requested by a user, is divided into Kf file chunks of size
Lminf which we define as the minimum file size that we assign to a frequency band. Then, we
formulate the problem of spectrum allocation in an LTE-U system as a Bayesian one-to-many
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matching game in which a set of frequency bands is assigned to a set of file chunks, where each
file chunk is served over a single frequency band and by a single BS. In the model we consider,
the users act on behalf of the files and the BSs act on behalf of the licensed and unlicensed
channels.
Thus, to model the problem as a Bayesian one-to-many matching game [36], we consider the
two sets A ∈ N ×F of subfile-user pairs andM∈ C×S of licensed/unlicensed frequency band
and BS pairs as two sets of players. We denote the set of licensed frequency bands by C1 and
the set of unlicensed channels by C2 with C = C1∪C2. The matching is defined as an assignment
of subfiles and users pairs in A to BSs and channels pairs in M in which the BSs act on behalf
of the licensed and unlicensed channels as they are the ones to decide on which frequency band
they serve their traffic. Moreover, the users act on behalf of the files and determine the BS and
channel to accept or not. Depending on the achievable rate and the price charged by the MNO,
every user i builds a preference relation (i,f) for its file chunk f over subsets of BS and channel
pairs in M and being unmatched ∅. Similarly, every BS builds a preference relation (s,c) [35]
for its channel c over the pairs of users and subfiles in A. In classical matching games, the
players define their preferences based on a utility function that measure their performance in the
network when matched to any of the players in the opposite set. In our model, the utility of any
BS or user depends on the traffic served by each BS and frequency band which is a function
of users’ type. Therefore, in the presence of types distribution, instead of computing the exact
utilities, the players define their preferences based on the expected utilities.
The number of users that a BS can serve over a given frequency band depends on the total
traffic load on each frequency band as well as the channel conditions. In a matching game,
the capacity of a pair (s, c) is known as a quota that we denote by q(s,c) [37]. A one-to-many
matching game can be defined as follows.
Definition 3. A one-to-many matching µ is a mapping from the set A ∪M into the set of all
subsets of A ∪M such that for every m = (s, c) ∈M and a = (i, f) ∈ A [38]:
1) µ(m) is contained in A and µ(a) is an element of M;
2) |µ(m)| ≤ q(s,c) for all (s, c) in M;
3) |µ(a)| ≤ 1 for all a in A;
4) m is in µ(a) if and only if a is in µ(m),
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with µ(m) being the set of user-subfile pairs that is associated to channel c and BS s under
matching µ.
This definition states that a matching is a one-to-many relation in the sense that each channel-
BS pair is matched to a set of user-subfile pairs, and each subfile is served over a single frequency
band and a single BS. Before setting an assignment of subfiles to frequency bands, each player
needs to specify its preferences over subsets of the opposite set based on its goal in the network.
We use the notation A1 (s,c) A2 to represent that BS s prefers to serve over frequency band c,
the user-subfile pairs in the set A1 ⊆ A than to serve the ones in A2 ⊆ A. A similar notation
is used for the users to set a preference list over the opposite set of BS-channel pairs. Faced
with a set M of possible partners, a user that requests a subfile f can determine a preference
relation over the frequency bands and BSs pairs. We denote by (µ, s1, c1) a (µ, s2, c2) the
preference of user-subfile pair a = (i, f) when user i prefers being served by BS s1 over
frequency band c1 to being served by BS s2 over frequency band c2 given the current matching
µ, with (µ, s1, c1) 6= (µ, s2, c2). Next, we define the preferences of the users and the BSs.
1) Preferences of users: From the users’ side, each user seeks to maximize its own individual
expected utility function for a given requested subfile. Therefore, from the users’ point of view,
we use the difference between the achievable rate and the price charged by the MNO for the
user as the utility function. Thus, using the channel coefficient estimation, and the distribution of
other users types, a user i determines its utility for every subfile it requests f given the possible
BS-channel pairs using the expected utility defined in (7), and thus, builds a preference vector
ξa with a = (i, f),∀f ∈ Fi and Fi ⊆ F being the set of file chunks that user i requests.
2) Preferences of the base stations: We now define a novel preference scheme at the BSs to
give priority to the users based on the type they reveal for the MNO. A similar model is consid-
ered in [39] in which it is shown that exploiting the information concealed in user’ preferences
offers considerable gains for the players. However, unlike [39], not only the preferences of users
impact the utility of the BSs but also the types of users as discussed previously. Moreover, we
account for the fact that users may manipulate the outcome of the matching process in their
favor by misreporting their types [34]. Furthermore, unlike [39], the BSs can serve multiple files
at a given frequency band which introduces externalities as the performance achievable by every
user depends on the types of other users which indirectly determine the traffic load on each
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channel.
The utility of a BS when serving a pair a = (i, f) of type θa over frequency band c given
that users reveal their real types, can be given by:
γma = pia(θa,θ−a)− ca(µ(θ), θa,θ−a), (20)
where we replace αi in the cost function by the current matching µ since the fraction of traffic
that is served over each of the licensed and unlicensed bands is determined by the current
matching outcome. The utility of the BS represents the difference between the price that the
user pays and the cost for being served at its target QoS. Knowing that users have different
QoS requirements, we introduce a priority vector φ ∈ {0, 1}1×A for the user-subfile pairs in
A. This vector allows the BSs to assign priorities for the user-subfile pairs. Depending on the
priority given to a user-subfile pair, a BS will promote the utility of the particular user-subfile
pair. If pair a has another licensed frequency band option to which it can apply according to
its preference vector, the BS sets φ(a) = 1, otherwise φ(a) = 0. Consequently, the priority
vectors are different at each BS and frequency band pair. Thus, instead of ranking users by only
accounting for the cost of serving the subfile of the user and the price charged by the MNO,
each BS takes into account the QoS requirements of every subfile. The utility function of each
BS-channel pair m = (s, c) when serving a pair a = (i, f) given the types distribution of the
users and the current matching µ can be defined as follows:
ξma(I, µ,θ) =
∫
Θ
[
γma(θa,θ−a)
]
dP (θ) + (1− )Ψma(ηa, I(µ(θ),θ), κsi), (21)
where the BS’s utility is a function of priority coefficient ηa, resemblance factor  ∈ {0, 1}, and
users’ types. Clearly, user-subfile pair a will be rejected if its utility is not one of the qm highest
utilities. If two users are identified by the BS to which they apply, to have the same priority and
the subfiles they request are of the same type, then  = 1. Otherwise, the BS assigns  = 0 to
the utility of those two users. Function Ψma is given by:
Ψma(ηa, I(µ(θ),θ)) =
∫
Θ
[
γma(θa,θ−a) +Gma
]
dP (θ),
=
∫
Θ
γma(θa,θ−a) +
ci(µ(θ), θa,θ−a)
θaηa
dP (θ). (22)
The promotion function Gma represents the amount of promotion given to each user. It enables
the BSs to prioritize serving the files with high type and less remaining options, over the licensed
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bands as we show later. That is, a BS decreases the cost for serving this user based on user’s
priority ηa and type θa. The higher the priority or the type of a given subfile, the more promotion
it receives from the BS. Basically, let ηa ∈ {η′, η′′, η′′′} indicate the first, second and third priority
coefficient, respectively. Parameter  is used to avoid prioritizing two subfiles that have the same
priority, since the promotion is a function of the users types and channel estimations knowing
that a single user may have multiple requests. Clearly, the proposed priorities allow to promote
subfiles that are experiencing a lower data rate compared to their required QoS, thus, allowing
them to have a better BS and spectrum association. The prioritizing procedure is described as
follows.
For every frequency band c, a BS s can group the user-subfile pairs into three priority classes
as follows:
Priority 1: This includes user-subfile pairs that have BS s and channel c as their first and their
only remaining preference with c being a licensed frequency band. Therefore, these remaining
applicants have been accepted by BS s and channel c in the first iteration of proposals. That is,
all a have φm(a) = 0 and ξa(1) = (s, c).
Priority 2: This includes user-subfile pairs for which BS s and channel c is not the first preference
but it is the only remaining BS in the preference list that contains a licensed band. In other words,
φm(a) = 0 and ξa(1) 6= (s, c) and ∃ m1 6= m ∈M with c1 ∈ C1 such that (s1, c1) a (s, c).
Priority 3: This includes user-subset pairs that, if and when rejected by BS s, they still have
other choices in their preference list that include a licensed frequency band.
In such practical systems in which users only know the distribution of the other users’ types,
the goal of the users is to select their contracts so that they reach a Bayesian stable matching
(BSM) that can be defined as follows [40], [41]:
Definition 4. The BSM represents the state in which none of the users can improve its expected
utility by selecting another contract given the distribution of other users’ types.
To reach the BSM outcome, next, we propose a distributed matching algorithm for the
assignment of the unlicensed bands to the files requested by the users.
3) Proposed LTE-U Spectrum Allocation Algorithm: In Table I, we introduce a spectrum
allocation algorithm in an LTE-U system based on the deferred acceptance algorithm [36], [42].
Unlike classical one-to-many matching games with externalities in which a swap-matching is
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Table I: Proposed LTE-U spectrum allocation algorithm.
inputs: M;A; ∀i, pii; P (θ)
Phase 1 - Specification of the preferences
- Each BS-channel pair and user-subfile pair set its preference list based on the utility functions (21) and
(7), respectively.
Phase 3 - Matching algorithm
Repeat
- For every subfile f ∈ Fi, user i sends its preference list to the next BS-band pair m to which it has
not applied yet.
- Every BS s updates its applicants list for every channel c ∈ C and assigns priorities to the users as
defined in Section IV. 2. Then, the BS updates its preference list φm for every pair m ∈ {s} × C.
- Every BS s accepts the q(s,c) most preferred applicants for every channel c ∈ C and rejects the others.
- The rejected user-subfile pairs remove the rejecting BS-channel pair from their list of preferences.
Until no user-subfile pair is rejected.
Output: Bayesian stable matching µ.
defined as an outcome of the algorithm [43], the difference is in the utility functions of the
players. In fact, since the distribution of users types is known to the BSs, every BS and user can
determine an estimation of the interference that any user may experience over a given frequency
bands. Thus, the players do not need to update their utilities and preferences based on the current
matching µ at every proposals period.
Proposition 2. The proposed spectrum allocation algorithm for LTE-U networks is guaranteed
to converge to a Bayesian stable outcome.
Proof. The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed due to the externalities that are canceled
out in a matching game with incomplete information. In fact, given that the users estimate their
utilities, they do not need to have the exact set of users and subfiles that are served over every
channel. Moreover, the fact that the algorithm is based on the classical deferred acceptance
algorithm guarantees the convergence to a stable outcome.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider 200 users unless stated otherwise, deployed in a 1 × 1 km
area served by 20 BSs via 12 unlicensed channels and 120 backhaul resource blocks (BRBs).
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Table II: Simulation parameters.
Parameters Values Parameters Values
Total number of BSs 20 Required rate per user {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7}Mbps
Total number of WAPs 10 WAP communication range 90 m
Total number of unlicensed channels 12 BS communication range 200 m
Total number of licensed resource blocks 120 Path loss exponent 3
Noise power -174 dBm/Hz Total number of files 100
Total bandwidth 1 GHz Size of a file 50 Mbits
The users can request files of different QoS levels that we rank from 1 to 6 for the corresponding
values [200, 250, 350, 450, 550, 650] Mbps. The network parameters are provided in Table II.
Fig. 2 shows the mean achievable rate by the users in the scenario with complete information
in which case the BSs know the rate requirement of the users and the Bayesian framework
we considered. The performance of the users in the proposed mechanism approaches their
performance in the case of complete information. The data rate of the users decreases in the
network due to the interference that is larger when the number of users increases in the network.
Moreover, the allocated resource blocks per user decreases as the number of users increases.
In Fig. 3, we show the impact of the evolution of users’ utility when they select different
contracts. A given user achieves its highest utility when selecting the contracts designed for
their own types. Indeed, when a user selects a contract of a type higher than its own type, the
user cannot afford the resource blocks that are allocated to serve its content. However, when a
user selects a contract of lower type, the resource blocks that are allocated to serve its content
are not sufficient to meet its QoS requirements.
In Fig. 4, we compare the amount of traffic that is served over unlicensed bands for the type 1
users and type 3 users. Depending on the case we consider, we add type 3 or type 1 users to the
network. The results show that the amount of traffic offloaded to the unlicensed bands increases
for both type 1 and type 3 users as the number of users increases in the system. However, more
type 1 traffic is served over unlicensed bands as the requirement in terms of data rate is less
critical compared to type 3 traffic and the amount of offloaded traffic remains the same when
the number of users exceeds 600 due to the saturation of the unlicensed bands.
Fig. 5 shows the fraction of users that achieve their QoS requirement as a function of the
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Fig. 2: Numerical results for the mean data rate per user as a function of the number of users.
number of users in the networks. In Fig. 5, we compare the proposed mechanism with an
allocation framework in which a random number of users accept to be served over the unlicensed
channels. The fraction of users that achieve their QoS decreases by increasing the number of
users in the networks because the licensed and unlicensed channels have to be shared among a
large number of users which decreases their data rate. The proposed mechanism outperforms by
up to 45% the unaware QoS resource allocation algorithm. This is due to the random allocation
of the licensed and unlicensed bands that does not account for the requirements of the users.
Thus, the random allocation can result in users with high QoS requirements served via unlicensed
channels.
In Fig. 6, we compare the proposed contract-based pricing scheme with a uniform pricing
mechanism in which the same price is fixed for serving the files. The results in Fig. 6 show the
evolution of the users’ utility as a function of the number of users in the system. The experienced
utility per the users decreases when increasing the number of users. This is due to the interference
from the BSs that impact the achievable data rate per user. When the network has more than
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Fig. 5: Fraction of users that achieve their required QoS as a function of the number of users.
600 users, the difference between the two schemes becomes substantial as the average utility per
user becomes twice higher than the utility they achieve under the uniform pricing scheme. This
is due to the prices fixed by the MNO that are adapted to the requirement of the users which
incite them to select the contract that offers the best possible data rate by accounting for other
users requirements and traffic load.
In Fig. 7, we compare the amount of traffic that is served over licensed bands for type 1
users and type 3 users as a function of the number of BSs in the network. The results show that
the amount of traffic served via the licensed bands decreases initially for both type 1 and type
3 users as the number of BSs becomes higher in the system. However, more type 1 traffic is
served over licensed bands as the data rate requirement of type 1 users is less critical compared
to type 3 traffic. Moreover, Fig. 7 shows that the amount of traffic served over the unlicensed
bands remains relatively the same for both type 1 and type 3 users when the number of BSs
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exceeds 60 BSs. This is due to the limited licensed spectrum resources that are shared among
all of the BSs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel LTE-U incentive mechanism that motivates users
to accept being served over unlicensed channel. To this end, we have used contract theory
enabling every MNO to set a pricing mechanism for LTE-U users and then used matching
theory to determine the fraction of LTE traffic that should be offloaded to the unlicensed bands
while accounting for the QoS requirements of every content. The main advantage of using
contract theory is the ability to model information asymmetry and incompleteness given that
it is difficult for MNOs to gather information about users requirements. The outcome of the
contract mechanism is a contract defined by the price charged by the MNO for serving the
content as well as the amount of resource that is required to achieve the required QoS by the
users. Moreover, we have proposed a distributed matching algorithm to allocate both licensed
and unlicensed frequency bands to the users. Simulations results have shown that the traffic can
be better allocated using the proposed mechanism and increase the fraction of users that are
served at their requested QoS.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We divide the proof into two parts. First, we prove that if p¯ii(θi) ≥ p¯ii(θˆi), then v¯i(θi) ≥ v¯i(θˆi).
Due to TIBS constraint in (4), we have:
θiv¯i(α, θi)− p¯ii(θi) ≥ θiv¯i(α, θˆi)− p¯ii(θˆi), (23)
i.e.,
θi
[
v¯i(α, θi)− v¯i(α, θˆi)
]
≥ −p¯ii(θi)− p¯ii(θˆi). (24)
Since p¯ii(θi) ≥ p¯ii, we conclude:
θi
[
v¯i(α, θi)− v¯i(α, θˆi)
]
≥ −p¯ii(θi)− p¯ii(θˆi) ≥ 0. (25)
and thus, v¯i(α, θi) ≥ v¯i(α, θˆi). Next, we prove that if v¯i(α, θi) ≥ v¯(α, θˆi), then p¯ii(θi) ≥ p¯ii(θˆi).
Due to TIBS constraint in (4), we have
θiv¯i(α, θi)− p¯ii(θi) ≥ θiv¯i(α, θˆi)− p¯ii(θˆi), (26)
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which can be transformed to be
p¯ii(θˆi)− p¯ii(θi) ≥ θi
[
v¯i(α, θˆi)− v¯i(θi)
]
. (27)
Since v¯i(α, θˆi) ≥ v¯i(θi), we conclude:
p¯ii(θˆi)− p¯ii(θi) ≥ θi
[
v¯i(θˆi)− v¯i(α, θi)
]
≥ 0, (28)
and thus p¯ii(θˆi) ≥ p¯ii(θi).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM1
First part of the proof “if-part”: First, we show that 1) and 2) in Theorem 1 imply TIBS. Take
any two values θi, θˆi ∈ [
¯
θi, θ¯i] with θi > θˆi >
¯
θ. From 2) we have:
u¯i(θi)−
∫ θi
θ¯i
v¯i(α, η)dη = u¯i(θˆi)−
∫ θˆi
θˆi
v¯i(α, η)dη. (29)
Rearranging terms and using 1) gives:
u¯i(θi)− u¯i(θˆi) =
∫ θi
θˆi
v¯i(α, η)dη ≥
∫ θi
θˆi
v¯i(α, θˆi)dη = (θi − θˆi)v¯i(α, θˆi). (30)
Note that v¯i(α, θˆi) is a constant. Hence,
u¯i(θi) ≥ u¯i(θˆi) + (θi − θˆi)v¯i(α, θˆi) = θiv¯i(α, θˆi) + p¯ii(θˆi). (31)
Similarly, suppose that θˆi ≥ θi ≥
¯
θi. By the same reasoning, we have
u¯i(θˆi) ≥ u¯i(θi) + (θˆi − θi)v¯i(α, θi) = (θˆi − θi)v¯i(α, θi). (32)
Together, (31) and (32) imply TIBS. Next, we prove that 1), 2) and 3) in Theorem 1 imply
IIR. We do this by contradiction. Suppose the implication is wrong. Then, there exists some
θi ≥
¯
θi with u¯i(θi) ≤ 0. We just established that 1) and 2) imply TIBS. However, TIBS in
conjunction with 3) implies:
u¯i(θi) ≥ θiv¯i(α,
¯
θi)− p¯ii(
¯
θi) >
¯
θiv¯i(α,
¯
θi)− p¯ii(
¯
θi), (33)
a contradiction.
”Only if part”: We now show that TIBS implies 1), and 2). For any i ∈ N and any two types
θi, θˆi ∈ [
¯
θi, θ¯i], TIBS requires that,
u¯i(θi) ≥ θiv¯i(α, θˆi)− p¯ii(θˆi) = u¯i(θˆi) + (θi − θˆi)v¯i(α, θˆi), (34)
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and,
u¯i(θˆi) ≥ θˆiv¯i(α, θi)− p¯ii(θi) = u¯i(θi) + (θi − θˆi)v¯i(α, θi). (35)
Suppose without loss of generality that θi ≤ θˆi. From (34) and (35), it follows that
v¯i(α, θˆi) ≥ u¯i(θi)− u¯(θˆi)
θi − θˆi
≥ v¯i(α, θi), (36)
which shows that v¯i(.) is nondecreasing. Next, letting θˆi → θi, we obtain du¯i(θi)dθi = v¯i(θi) for all
θi. Integrating both sides over [
¯
θi, θi] gives
u¯i(θi) = u¯(θi) +
∫ θi
¯
θi
v¯i(α, η)dη, (37)
∀θi. Finally, note that IIR obviously implies 3) by definition of IIR.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
A. Feasibility conditions:
We first show how we derive the price in (18). We replace conditions (10) and (9) in (17) by
the conditions provided in Theorem 1:
max
{αi(θ),pii(θ)}∀i
∫
Θ
∑
i∈N
[pii(θi,θ−i)− ci(θi,θ−i)] dP (θ),
subject to v¯i(θi) is nondecreasing,
u¯i(θi) = u¯i(
¯
θi) +
∫ θi
¯
θi
v¯i(α, η)dη,∀θi, i ∈ N ,
u¯i(
¯
θi) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ αi(θ) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
(38)
After doing some algebraic manipulations on the second constraint in (38), we have:
−
∫
Θ
pii(θ) =
¯
θivi(α,
¯
θi)− pii(
¯
θi)−
∫
Θ
pii(θ)
(
θi − 1− Pi(θi)
pi(θi)
)
dP (θ). (39)
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Inserting (39) in the objective function of the optimization problem (38), the problem can be
relaxed and written as:
max
{αi(θ),pii(θ)}∀i
∫
Θ
∑
i∈N
[pii(θi,θ−i)− ci(θi,θ−i)] dP (θ),
subject to v¯i(α, θi) is nondecreasing,
u¯i(
¯
θi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ αi(θ) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
(40)
We can see that the second constrain in (40) must bind, thus we have:
u¯i(
¯
θi) = 0, (41)
for all i ∈ N . By Theorem 1, we can write (41) as:
p¯i∗i (θi) = θiv¯i(, α
∗
i , θi) +
∫ θi
¯
θi
v¯i(α
∗
i , η)dη, (42)
where we used ui(θi) = θiv¯i(αi, θi)− p¯ii(θi). Next, we proof the optimality and the uniqueness
of this solution.
B. Proof of optimality:
We first show that the optimal price in (1) maximizes the utility of the MNO assuming that the
amount of traffic served over the licensed and unlicensed bands is fixed to {α∗i , ∀i}. Suppose that
that there exists another feasible price {p˜ii,∀i} which achieves a better solution than {pi∗i ,∀i}
in (1). Since the expected utility of the MNO given by the objective function in (17) is an
increasing function of the total sum of the prices
∑
i∈N pii payed by the users, we must have
that
∑
i∈N p˜ii >
∑
i∈N pi
∗
i . Thus, for at least one user of type θi, we have p˜ii > pi
∗
i which is
equivalent to p˜ii > pi∗i because we have p¯ii(θi,θ−i) =
∫
Θ−i
pii(θi,θ−i)dP−i(θ−i).
If i = 1, then p˜i1 > pi∗1. Since pi∗i = θ1v¯1(αi, θi), then p˜i1 > θ1v¯1(αi, θi). However, it violates
the IIR constraint for type θ1. Thus, we have to check if for any i > 1 the supposition can be
satisfied.
Since {p˜ii, ∀i} is feasible, then {p˜ii,∀i} must satisfy the right inequality of condition 3) in
Theorem 1. Thus, we have:
p˜ii ≤ p˜ii−1 + θi(v¯i(αi, θ)− v¯i−1(αi−1, θi−1)). (43)
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By substituting θi(v¯i(αi, θ) − v¯i−1(αi−1, θi−1)) = pi∗i − pi∗i−1 as in (1) into this inequality, we
have
p˜ii−1 > pi∗i−1. (44)
Using the above argument repeatedly, we finally obtain that
p˜i1 > pi∗1 = θ1v¯1(α1, θ1), (45)
which violates the IIR constraint for type-θ1 again.
C. Proof of uniqueness:
Here, we prove that the price defined in (1) is the unique solution that maximizes the objective
function in (17). We also prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists another {pˆii, ∀i} 6=
{pi∗i ,∀i} such that
∑
i∈N pˆii =
∑
i∈N pi
∗
i in the objective function of (17).
Thus, there is at least one user for which the price satisfies, pˆii < pi∗i and one user for which
pˆil > pi∗l. We can focus on type θl and pˆil > pi∗l. By using the same argument as before, we
have pˆi1 > pi∗1 = θ1v¯1(α1, θ1) which violates the IIR constraint for type θ1.
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